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Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure, a
most critical system the Internet depends on, has re-
cently been the target for different DDoS and other
cyber-attacks, e.g., the notorious Mirai botnet. While
these attacks can be destructive to both recursive and
authoritative DNS servers, little is known about how
recursive resolvers operate under such attacks (e.g., NX-
Domain, water-torture). In this paper, we point out a
new vulnerability and show an attack, the NXNSAttack,
that exploits the way DNS recursive resolvers operate
when receiving NS referral response that contains name-
servers but without their corresponding IP addresses (i.e.,
missing glue-records). We show that the number of DNS
messages exchanged in a typical resolution process might
be much higher in practice than what is expected in the-
ory, mainly due to a proactive resolution of name-servers’
IP addresses. We show how this inefficiency becomes a
bottleneck and might be used to mount a devastating
attack against either or both, recursive resolvers and
authoritative servers. The NXNSAttack is more effective
than the NXDomain attack: i) It reaches an amplifica-
tion factor of more than 1620x on the number of packets
exchanged by the recursive resolver. ii) Besides the neg-
ative cache, the attack also saturates the ‘NS’ resolver
caches. In an attempt to mitigate the attack impact, we
propose enhancements to the recursive resolvers algo-
rithm to prevent unnecessary proactive fetches. Finally,
we implement our Max1Fetch enhancement on the BIND
resolver and show that Max1Fetch does not degrade the
recursive resolvers performance, throughput and latency,
by testing it on real-world traffic data-sets.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure, a most
critical highly dynamic system on which almost any
access to a resource on the Internet depends, has re-
cently been an attractive target to a variety of DDoS
attacks [4, 26]. As seen in the Mirai attack [4], a degra-
dation or outage of part of the DNS service disrupts
many popular websites such as Twitter, Reddit, Net-
flix, and many others, impacting millions of Internet
users. Moreover, recent large scale attacks were directly
trying to take down parts of the DNS system by flood-
ing the DNS servers with well-structured requests of
randomly-generated non-existent sub-domains known as
NXDomain attacks [28] (or water-torture attack [16, 26],
or PRSD attack).
These attacks can be destructive to both recursive
resolvers and authoritative DNS servers. While author-
itative servers are usually the prime target of such at-
tacks [3, 4, 16,22], the damages are often not limited to
the target itself but involve severe collateral damages
to recursive resolvers as well. Indeed, it has been re-
ported [24,26] that ISP recursive resolvers were knocked
down during such attacks (and more such cases go un-
reported). Still, little is known about how recursive re-
solvers operate under NXDomain and similar complexity
attacks.
This paper focuses on recursive resolvers and has three
major parts. First, we perform an in-depth analysis of
the complex DNS recursive behavior and the interaction
between its various algorithms and components using the
popular BIND [11] server implementation, to expose their
inefficiencies. Secondly, we uncover a new vulnerability
in their algorithms, and display a new attack, the NXN-
SAttack that exploits the way DNS recursive resolvers
operate. Finally, we suggest and analyze a modification
to the recursive resolver algorithms, called Max1Fetch,
that drastically reduces the effectiveness of the NXNSAt-
tack attack. Notice that investigating recursive resolvers
and measuring their performance is challenging due to
their interaction with many live name servers.
At an abstract level, the DNS system has two parts,
each of which is a highly distributed large system around
the globe: a hierarchical and dynamic database of author-
itative name-servers storing the DNS data, and a huge
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number of client-facing resolvers, located either locally at
the service providers and local organizations, or as cloud
public services (e.g., CloudFlare 1.1.1.1), that query the
hierarchical structure to provide domain names resolu-
tions to IP addresses. The focus of the current paper is
on the interaction between the recursive resolvers and
the authoritative hierarchical structure.
During the resolution process, the recursive resolver
walks through the authoritative hierarchy to obtain the
definitive answer for its request. This iterative walk usu-
ally involves delegations from one authoritative zone to
another. The delegation messages are called name servers
(NS) referral responses. In this delegation message, an
authoritative server tells the recursive resolver: “I do not
know the answer, go and query these and these name
servers, e.g., ns1, ns2, etc., instead”. One of our main
observations is that the information in the NS referral
responses, at the different recursive steps, and the ac-
tions taken by the recursive resolvers as a result, may
introduce large undesired overheads.
The main reason for these overheads is that the name-
servers in the NS referral response are not always pro-
vided with their corresponding IP addresses (known as
glue records). Top-level authoritative domains (TLDs),
second-level domains (SLDs), and other authoritative
servers are not allowed to provide IP addresses for do-
mains that do not reside in the same zone origin (known
as Out-of-Bailiwick name-servers [2]). This is mostly to
protect from DNS poisoning attacks.
We study the implications and prevalence of this phe-
nomenon. Our first observation (given in §2) is that the
number of packets involved in a typical resolution pro-
cess is much higher in practice than expected in theory,
mainly due to proactive extra resolutions of name-servers
IP Addresses.
Secondly, we show how the proactive resolution of
all the name servers in the referral response becomes
a major bottleneck in recursive servers such as BIND.
BIND is considered as the de-facto standard for DNS
software. We present a new attack, called NXNSAttack
(§3), that exploits this vulnerability and is more effec-
tive against authoritative and recursive servers than the
NXDomain attack (§4.5). We show three variants of this
attack (a, b, and c in Table 1) analyzing their impact
on a BIND based recursive resolver and authoritative
servers. (§4). The NXNSAttack simulations saturate the
recursive resolver’s cache (with NX & NS records) and
reach a packet amplification factor (PAF) of more than
1600x (variant a). The key enabler for the attack is the
ease with which an attacker can acquire and control an
authoritative server.
Thirdly, we enhance the BIND DNS resolver algo-
rithms to remove unnecessary proactive fetches (§5),
thus alleviating the vulnerability and measure the per-
Attack target Max Amplification
(victim) factor
Bytes Packets
NXDomain At-
tack (Mirai [4])
Authoritative
name-server
2.6x 2x
NXNSAttack
a Recursive
resolver
163x 1621x
b Authoritative
SLD
21x 75x
c Root / TLD 99x 1071x
Table 1: Three variants of the NXNSAttack, and the
NXDomain attack [28] empirical evaluation under BIND
9.12.3
formance improvements of the enhancement, called
Max1Fetch. In particular, we show it has no negative im-
pact on either the latency or throughput of the enhanced
recursive resolver.
Finally, (§6), we quantify the pervasiveness of domains
with out-of-bailiwick name-servers in: (i) the top million
domains resolutions, and (ii) in a real-life DNS traffic
trace observed at our campus. Since the inefficiency and
vulnerability we uncover are associated mostly with re-
ferral responses that contain many name-servers without
an associated IP address, we study how common is this
phenomena. We notice that in 60% of the domains, all
their name-servers are out-of-bailiwick name-servers.
Related work is given in §7, Disclosure procedure in
§8 and conclusions are provided in §9.
2 Background: DNS Resolution Process
Overhead
The DNS infrastructure consists mostly of two types of
servers, authoritatives and resolvers, from each of which
there are millions of servers spread all over the world. The
DNS directory itself is stored in the authoritative name-
servers, which are organized in a delegated hierarchical
structure. These servers are authorized to provide the
DNS data (including IP addresses) for a specific zone
without performing requests to other DNS servers.
In contrast, DNS resolvers perform the DNS resolu-
tion on behalf of clients that query them, to translate
a domain name to its corresponding current IP address.
Recursive resolvers (located at ISPs, large organizations,
or public cloud resolvers) perform a full DNS resolu-
tion by sending queries to the authoritative hierarchical
structure.
Recursive resolvers (and stub-resolvers) use a cache to
significantly reduce the number of requests that reach
the authoritative hierarchy. A TTL is associated with
each record in the cache, indicating for how long this
entry is valid. The TTL is provided by the authorita-
tive that sent the corresponding response. The cache
records are also labeled by the type of query/response
2
Authoritative 
Hierarchy
Recursive 
Resolvers
PC/Device,
Stub Resolvers
cache
Stub
Resolver
cache
Browser
cache
DNS
Recursive
DNS
root 
servers
DNS TLD 
servers
(com.,net.,…)
DNS domain 
nameserversModem
cache
www.microsoft.com
NS RR for .com 
www.microsoft.com
NS RR for 
microsoft.com 
www.microsoft.com
‘A’ RR for 
www.microsoft.com
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 1: The resolution process, in theory, for the
domain www.microsoft.com. The red steps represent NS
referral responses.
that produced them: A, AAAA, NS, or NX corresponding
to the IPv4 address of a particular host, IPv6 address,
the authoritative name-servers for the domain or zone,
a domain name that does not exist in the appropriate
authoritative server, respectively.
2.1 The Resolution Process: In Theory
When an answer is not found in the recursive resolver’s
cache, it walks through the authoritative hierarchy to ob-
tain the answer as shown in Figure 1, where the recursive
resolver resolves the domain name www.microsoft.com,
assuming that the recursive resolver’s cache is empty;
thus, it issues a query to one of the root servers (e.g.,
A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET, whose IP address is hard-
coded into the recursive resolver), asking for the address
of www.microsoft.com (see step 1 in Figure 1). The
root server returns an NS referral response delegating
the query to one of few TLD (Top Level Domain) name
servers, that are responsible for the ‘.com’ zone (step 2).
The recursive resolver selects one of these name servers
and issues another query (step 3) asking the chosen TLD
name server (assuming it has its IP address) for the
address of www.microsoft.com. The TLD (.com) server
returns an NS referral response (step 4) with the names
of a few SLD (Secondary Level Domain) name-servers
responsible for the zone ‘microsoft.com’. In a similar way
to the previous iteration, the recursive resolver selects
one of these name servers and issues another query ask-
ing for the address of www.microsoft.com (step 5). The
SLD authoritative server owns the DNS records for all
the domains under ‘microsoft.com’, thus returns an ‘A’
response with the requested IP address (step 6).
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'A' request www.microsoft.com
Recursive
com. 
nameserver
Referral Response
Section Record
Authority microsoft.com.   NS   ns1.msft.net 
microsoft.com.   NS   ns2.msft.net
microsoft.com.   NS   ns3.msft.net
microsoft.com.   NS   ns4.msft.net
Additional No Glue Records
'A' request ns1.msft.net
'A' request ns2.msft.net
'A' request ns3.msft.net
'A' request ns4.msft.net
net. 
nameserver
Referral Response to (3)
Section Record
Authority ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns1.msft.net 
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns2.msft.net
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns3.msft.net
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns4.msft.net
Additional ns1.msft.net.   A   208.84.0.53 
ns2.msft.net.   A   208.84.2.53
ns3.msft.net.   A   193.221.113.53
ns4.msft.net.   A   208.76.45.53
glue
records
ns1.msft.net
microsoft.com.
nameserver
'A' request ns1.msft.net
'A' request ns2.msft.net
'A' request ns3.msft.net
'A' request ns4.msft.net
'A' request www.microsoft.com
'A' response ns1.msft.net 208.84.5.53
'A' response ns2.msft.net 208.84.2.53
'A' response ns3.msft.net 193.221.113.53
'A' response ns4.msft.net 208.76.45.53
'A' response www.microsoft.com 13.77.161.179
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Referral Response to (4)
Section Record
Authority ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns1.msft.net 
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns2.msft.net
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns3.msft.net
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns4.msft.net
Additional ns1.msft.net.   A   208.84.0.53 
ns2.msft.net.   A   208.84.2.53
ns3.msft.net.   A   193.221.113.53
ns4.msft.net.   A   208.76.45.53
Referral Response t  (5)
Section Record
Authority ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns1.msft.net 
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns2.msft.net
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns3.msft.net
ns1.msft.net.   NS   ns4.msft.net
Additional ns1.msft.net.   A   208.84.0.53 
ns2.msft.net.   A   208.84.2.53
ns3.msft.net.   A   193.221.113.53
ns4.msft.net.   A   208.76.45.53
Referral Response to (6)
Section Record
Authority msft.net.   NS   ns1.msft.net 
msft.net.   NS   ns2.msft.net
msft.net.   NS   ns3.msft.net
msft.net.   NS   ns4.msft.net
Additional ns1.msft.net.   A   208.84.5.53 
ns2.msft.net.   A   208.84.2.53
ns3.msft.net.   A   193.221.113.53
ns4.msft.net.   A   208.76.45.53
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Figure 2: The resolution process, in practice, for the
domain www.microsoft.com by BIND 9.12.3 recursive
resolver (parallels the diagram in Fig. 1). The .net and
.com TLD nameservers are already cached at the begin-
ning of the process. The red steps are the mandatory
messages required to answer the client query.
2.2 The Resolution Process: In Practice
One of our main observations is that the information
in the NS referral response at the different recursive
steps (appear as responses (2), (4) in Figure 1) and the
actions taken by the recursive resolvers in response, may
introduce large undesired overheads.
We analyze thousands of resolutions taken from real-
life scenarios, popular websites, and campus DNS data,
inspecting the type and number of packets involved in
each resolution. Our focus is on the interaction between
the recursive resolvers and the authoritative hierarchical
structure. We performed a test on a recursive resolver
using BIND 9.12.3 installed on an AWS EC2 machine,
as well as on a local machine to inspect the code and
to analyze its internal components and algorithms. We
found out that while the procedure described in Figure 1,
results in a total of three requests and replies (if relevant
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information is not in the cache), in real life results in
many more messages (see the procedure described in Fig-
ure 2), sometimes hundreds, even if the cache is already
filled by many previous but different requests. For exam-
ple, microsoft.com resolution requires 54 IPv4 packets
(actually there are 126 packets involved, but we exclude
TCP handshake and control packets that are used in
the case that responses are too long due to additional
records and EDNS), twitter.com resolution requires
388 packets and www.gov.uk requires 102 packets.
In §5.3 we describe the data-sets that we use and
provide more details on how many queries resolutions
incur more messages than the one expected in theory.
For example, we show that 61.56% of the ‘A’ queries for
the top million domains introduce such overhead.
The main reason for these extra messages is that the
recursive resolver initiates new independent fetches (ad-
ditional ‘A’ resolutions) to resolve all the IP addresses
of out-of-bailiwick (this term is explained in the sequel)
name servers it received in the NS referral response.
These additional resolutions are not considered in the
theoretical procedure as depicted in Figure 1, but often
occur in practice (see Figure 2).
At a high level, for each client query, BIND resolver
maintains a recursion state to keep track of the current
resolution level in the hierarchical tree. Upon receiving
an NS referral response, in order to select the next name-
server to which it sends its query, the resolver walks
through each one of the name-servers it received in the
referral response, and checks whether it has its IP address
in its local cache.
If not present in the cache, either the resolver starts a
new resolution recursively, to resolve the names of the
name-servers in the list, or the NS referral response in-
cludes the IP addresses of the NS’s, which are called glue
records, eliminating the need for the additional recursive
resolution. Each such recursive resolution is independent
of the original client query, and new resolution states are
maintained for it.
This procedure results in pro-active resolutions for
all the non-cached name-servers that appear in the NS
referral without a corresponding glue-record, and is not
part of the configuration nor can be disabled.
Name Server Selection. The NS referral records
that appear as the responses (2), (4) in the example in
Figure 1 are used to list all the name-servers that are del-
egated to a child zone (i.e., any of these name-servers can
provide the next level in the recursive resolution process).
The DNS standard [RFC 1035] requires a minimum of
two authoritative name servers for every operational zone
for redundancy. However, in practice, service operators
at all levels often use more than two name-servers (see
§6) that are physically distributed over multiple servers
using anycast and load-balancing techniques.
The resolver has to select to which name-server from
the list it sends the query. Most of the recursive re-
solvers implementations use algorithms to distribute the
load among the different name-servers and achieve lower
latency over time when sending queries to authorita-
tive name servers. For example, BIND uses an sRTT
(smoothed Round Trip Time) algorithm with decaying
factor, in which it tracks the response time of each name
server. Other algorithms perform an initial round-robin
over the name servers followed by measured latency-
aware selections.
Glue Records and the Bailiwick rule. As men-
tioned before, the name-servers in an NS referral message
are specified by their domain names. To indicate the lo-
cation of the delegated name-servers, their IP address
may also be present in the NS referral response as addi-
tional A records. These additional A records appear in
an NS record, are called glue records. Glue records may
be present for none, some or all the name-servers in an
NS record. The DNS specifications do not provide clear
guidelines on when glue record should be present nor how
to process them on the recursive side. An old definition in
RFC 1034 [19] states that glue records are required only
if the NS is lying within or below the zone or domain for
which it acts as a name-server. This condition is known
as the Bailiwick rule. The reason for this requirement is
to avoid a query deadlock for NS referrals that contain
name servers within the domain being queried. For ex-
ample, if the recursive is performing a resolution for the
URL www.example.com and the TLD returns a referral
containing ns5.example.com as a delegated name-server
which resides within the example.com domain, but with-
out its IP address, the recursive will then initiate another
A query asking to resolve ns5.example.com. It will be
again referred to ns5.example.com, which leads to a
live-lock. A recent wider definition of the Bailiwick rule
appears in RFC 8499 [2], suggesting that sibling domains
(name-servers whose name is subordinate to the zone
origin, and not subordinate to the owner name of the
NS resource record) may also have glue records in their
parent zone (e.g., .com may provide a glue record for
ns.domain.com as a name-server for example.com). In
practice, as we measure in §6, authoritative servers pro-
vide glue records according to the wider definition in
order to eliminate extra overhead.
Notice that another motivation for the Bailiwick rule
is to avoid and reduce the risk possed by cache poisoning
attacks [27,29].
How recursive resolvers accept and treat glue records
returned by the authoritative servers is not defined in
the DNS specification and left to their implementations.
To prevent such cache poisoning attacks using malicious
glue records, many recursive implementations store glue
records as ‘A’ record in their cache only if they comply
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with the bailiwick rule. If the glue record refers to a name
server that resides within the domain for which it is a
name server (in-bailiwick, for example, ns.example.com
as a name server for the example.com zone) the recursive
will honor the IP address provided in the glue record as-
sociated with ns.example.com and store it in its cache.
Otherwise (out-of-bailiwick, for example, ns.example.net
as a name server for the example.com zone), it will discard
the glue record. Generally, without getting into different
variations and implementation details, BIND [11] recur-
sive implementation, which we analyze in this paper, as
well as Unbound [15], PowerDNS [1] and Microsoft DNS
all discard out-of-bailiwick glue records. Other solutions
to eliminate cache poisoning attacks as a result of out-of-
bailiwick glue records include DNSSEC - authenticating
the authoritative responses by verifying their signature,
but these have a low adoption rate.
Figure 2 illustrates the additional out-of-bailiwick re-
quests that the recursive issues for www.microsoft.com.
In this case, the TLD (.com and .net) name servers are
already in the cache as a result of previous requests.
The .com authoritative responds with an NS referral
(step 2) containing four out-of-bailiwick name servers
(ns*.msft.net for the queried zone microsoft.com). The
recursive then initiates four additional resolution fetches
for all these name servers. Note that even after it receives
their IP addresses in the referral responses (steps 7-10)
as glue records, it still performs additional resolution
requests for them (steps 11-14). This is because their
corresponding requests’ recursion state was already initi-
ated independently with an indication that they are not
cached.
2.3 Out-of-Bailiwick overhead implica-
tions
It is important to distinguish between the time in which
an authoritative name server from the list in the NS
referral response is resolved (to obtain its IP address)
and the actual time in which it is queried [23]. As shown
in [23], in each client request, a different authoritative
name-server from the list is likely to be queried in order
to improve latency. In this paper, we focus on the timing
of the resolution and propose it should be spread and
amortized over several client requests (see §5), and not as
it is now, where all the resolutions are performed in the
first client request. Moreover, many domains outsource
their authoritative name-servers to cloud operators such
as Cloudflare, domaincontrol.com, and these operators
often choose short TTL values (30 or 60 seconds). This
in turn, causes many server resolutions that have been
performed by the recursive resolver to be outdated by
the time the resolver wants to use them. As a result, the
resolver has to redo the corresponding resolution.
This gap between the number of resolution packets
per query expected in theory and the one observed in
practice raises several questions:
1. Does this phenomena introduce new vulnerabilities?
2. Should the recursive resolver resolve all the miss-
ing name-servers IP addresses upon arrival of the
first client query? Or should these extra queries be
amortized over future client queries?
3. What is the prevalence of Out-of-Bailiwick name-
servers?
4. What is the impact on the normal operation of
recursive resolvers? Does the cache mitigate the
overhead over time?
To answer the first question, we present the NXN-
SAttack in §3. We evaluate the attack and present our
experiments in §4.
Section 5 suggests a solution to mitigate the NXNSAt-
tack, and proposes an answer to the second question.
To evaluate our solution, and provide answers to the
third and fourth questions, we present our experiments
and measurements in §5 and §6. We measure the preva-
lence of Out-of-Bailiwick domains, and measure the Out-
of-Bailiwick additional resolutions overhead on two dif-
ferent data-sets: (i) the top million domains list. (ii) a
real-life DNS trace from our campus.
Note that we observed additional reasons for the high
number of messages in DNS resolutions, which are (i) too
long NS responses that include multiple name servers
and other options such as RRSIG and NSEC3 data in the
additional records, leaving no place for all the glue records
in a 512-byte UDP packet, forcing the recursive to resend
the request using TCP, or by using the UDP EDNS0 4096-
byte option. (ii) Canonical NAME records (CNAME)
that reside in different domains than the queried one,
these sometimes have to be resolved with an additional
fetch starting from the root-servers. However, we identify
the additional resolutions of name-servers IP addresses
as the major reason for the high number of messages.
Moreover, many of the other reasons mentioned above
are associated with new resolutions that are issued due
to the missing IP addresses of name-servers.
3 NXNSAttack
Here we exploit the multi name-server referral response
and the resulting extra resolutions to carry out a new
attack, NXNSAttack (NoneXistent NameServers Attack),
on different elements of the DNS infrastructure.
As shown in the previous section, for each name-server
name without an associated IP address, in the NS referral
response, the recursive resolver initiates a new resolution
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procedure. This is the core of our attack. The attacker
uses the authoritative that it owns to craft a response
to a resolver with a referral that contains n new and
nonexistent name-server names without an associated
IP address, and as a result, this resolver starts the pro-
cess of F new resolutions. As shown later, the maximum
F can be in the range, 74 ≤ F ≤ 2 ·n (in BIND imple-
mentation, 2n requests to resolve the IPv4 and IPv6
addresses). When the attacker generates many such re-
ferral responses repeatedly, she gets a DDoS attack on
either the resolver or on a corresponding authoritative
server, with an amplification factor of O(F ) packets,
sometimes much larger than F . There are several pa-
rameters and variants of this basic principle that we
investigate in this paper.
3.1 Threat Model
To mount a NXNSAttack on either a recursive resolver
or an authoritative server, an attacker should:
1. Have access to one or more DNS clients on the
Internet (May use a botnet such as in the Mirai IoT
botnet [4] or through an ad-network [13]).
2. Own or compromise an authoritative name-server.
This can be easily achieved by e.g., buying a domain
name. An adversary who acts as an authoritative
server has the ability to craft any NS referral re-
sponse as an answer to different DNS queries. It
controls the information that appears in the referral
response, such as the number of name-servers, their
names, and their glue records (as well as the absence
of glue records).
Controlling and acquiring a huge number of clients
and a large number of authoritative NSs by an attacker
is easy and cheap in practice. Authoritative name-servers
are easily acquired by first buying and registering new
domain names, which is cheap (for our experiments, we
purchased several domain names for less than $1 per
name) and takes less than 5 minutes. Secondly the ac-
quired domain names can be dynamically associated with
any authoritative server in the internet. Alternatively,
attackers today have the capabilities to compromise DNS
operators’ credentials and to manipulate zone-files and
sometimes even gain access to their registrar records, as
exemplified by recent DNS hijacking attacks [9, 30]. No-
tice that recently attackers achieved much harder to get
capabilities [4, 26] that use IoT botnets, Booters (DDoS
for hire services [12]) and dynamic C&C servers.
3.2 The Amplifier
The core building block of the NXNSAttack is the
amplifier (Figure 3), which is composed of three com-
Authoritative
NS 3
Attacker
Amplifier F=2n  resolutions
Authoritative 
NS 2
Authoritative 
NS F
Authoritative       
NS 1
Authoritative 
name-server
4
Client
Resolver
3
Figure 3: The amplifier
Request sd1.attacker.com
recursive resolver attacker.com 
authoritative 
name-server
victim.com 
authoritative 
name-server
Referral Response message
Section Record
Authority sd1.attacker.com.  NS   fake-1.victim.com 
sd1.attacker.com.  NS   fake-2.victim.com 
...
sd1.attacker.com.  NS   fake-n.victim.com 
Additional No Glue Records
nx
2nx
2nx
Request fake-1.victim.com 
Request fake-n.victim.com 
Figure 4: A different view of the messages exchanged in
Figure 3
ponents: two attacker components and one innocent
recursive resolver. The two attacker’s components are
a client and an authoritative name-server. Essentially
the attacker issues many requests for sub-domains of
domains authorized by its own authoritative server (step
1 in Fig. 3). Each such request is crafted to have a differ-
ent sub-domain to make sure it is not in the resolver’s
cache, thus forcing the resolver to communicate with the
attacker’s authoritative server to resolve the queried sub-
domains (step 2). The attacker authoritative name-server
then returns an NS referral response with n name-server
names but without their glue records(step 3), i.e., with-
out their associated IP addresses, forcing the resolver to
start a resolution query for each one of the name-server
names in the response, whether these name-servers are
in-bailiwick or out-of-bailiwick because it does not have
their IP addresses in its cache (step 4). The attacker’s
authoritative referral response issues n new and different
delegated name-servers each time it receives a query for
a sub-domain from the recursive resolver.
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Figure 5: NXNSAttack targeting the authoritative server
(a) and the recursive resolver (b)
An attacker can use the amplifier building block to at-
tack different targets and in a variety of ways, depending
on three parameters:
1. The name-servers that appear in the referral might
be at different levels of the DNS authoritative hier-
archy: Root, TLD, or SLD. Different levels result in
different maximum F factors as shown in §4.
2. Using multiple clients, communicating to multiple
resolvers to target a single SLD authoritative victim
(Fig. 5a), or using multiple name-servers to target
a particular recursive resolver (Fig. 5b).
3. Extend the attack recursively, by setting self-
delegations in the first malicious referral from the
attacker’s authoritative, which leads to F1 addi-
tional subsequent requests and corresponding refer-
ral responses (see Figure 6), each of which contains
n2 delegations, thus achieving up to 2n2 ·F1 name-
servers referrals.
These parameters are controlled by the attacker and
may be used to generate different attacks. Here we fo-
cus on three basic attacks: against a recursive resolver,
against an authoritative SLD victim (e.g., victim.com
name-server), and against the ROOT/TLD servers (.com,
and “.” see Table 1 for a summary of the amplification
factors).
Recursive resolver attack. (Fig. 5b) Here the max-
imum packet amplification factor (PAF) is 1620x (both
by the model and empirically see §4) which is achieved
when the referral delegations are to different TLD name-
servers, (e.g., fake1.com, fake2.com, ...,fake1.net, ...).
For each two packets the attacker components gener-
ate (one from the client, and one from the authoritative
name-server) the victim recursive resolver processes 3,242
packets, out of which 1,081 are DNS packets and the rest
are TCP connection control packets. The corresponding
bandwidth amplification (BAF) is 132x, see §4.3.
Authoritative SLD attack. (Fig. 5a) In this at-
tack, all the name-servers in the malicious referral
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Figure 6: Illustration of the double amplification attack
using self delegations in the first referral response. This
attack variant (c) reaches a firepower of F = F1 ·F2 =
37 ·2 ·135 ·2 = 19,980 (see §4.1).
are sub-domains of a victim SLD (second-level do-
main, e.g., fake-1.victim.com, fake-2.victim.com,
...). The maximum packets amplification factor is 74x,
and the corresponding bandwidth amplification factor
is 21x, see §4.3 for the cost and amplification factor
analysis.
ROOT/TLD attack: Here the attacker uses the self-
delegations technique (Fig. 6) to increase the number
of concurrent referrals to the ROOT name-servers. In
our empirical tests, the victim processes up to 81,428
packets (14,126,945 bytes) for each client request (and
corresponding 75 referral packets) that the attacker gen-
erates (it is “only” 81,428 because many were lost). The
high victim cost is because the first referral response from
the attacker contains delegations to 37 new and different
sub-domains of the attacker (e.g., sd1.attacker.com, ...
, sd37.attacker.com), which results in 74more requests
(IPv4 and IPv6 for each delegated ns) to the attacker
from the recursive resolver. The attacker’s authoritative
name-server then responds with 74 crafted referrals, each
of which contains 135 delegations to the ROOT server
(e.g., domain.fake or domain.tld where the tld name-
servers are not cached in the recursive resolver) which
in turn receives 18,980 concurrent requests see §4.3 for
the cost and amplification factor analysis.
4 NXNSAttack Analysis Evaluation
4.1 F , The Amplifier Firepower
The traffic fan-out of the amplifier as a result of one client
request is measured by either, the number of generated
resolution requests, or the number of packets sent, or the
number of bytes (bandwidth, bw) sent. In this section we
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present the corresponding numbers that were measured
in our test bed setup, and we provide an analysis that
accurately explains these numbers.
Theoretically if the recursive resolver receives a referral
response that delegates the original request to n name-
server names, without providing their IP address (no
glue records), the recursive then generates in response,
2n requests to resolve the IPv4 addresses and the IPv6,
of each of these n names. However, there are two pa-
rameters that limit this number. First the maximum
number of delegation names that fit into the referral
response, denoted nmax or just n. From our experiments
nmax is a function of the DNS packet size (including
EDNS(0) extensions [6] and DNS over TCP) and the
number of characters in the domain names. In our tests
nmax turned out to be 135. Second, in BIND, the max-
recursion-queries parameter that sets the maximum
total number of requests a recursive resolver can send in
the process of resolving one client request. As written
in the BIND 9.12 manual “max-recursion-queries: Sets
the maximum number of iterative queries that may be
sent while servicing a recursive query. If more queries
are sent, the recursive query is terminated and returns
SERVFAIL. Queries to look up top level domains such
as ‘com’ and ‘net’ and the DNS root zone are exempt
from this limitation. The default is 75”. We denote max-
recursion-queries as Max_rq.
Since in step 3 in Fig. 3 the recursive already sends one
request, the remaining Max_rq budget is 74. Which is
sufficient to resolve 37 names, requesting separately the
IPv4 and IPv6 address of each. Unless the requests are
sent to either the root or a TLD name-server, in which
case, nmax is the only limiting factor and the firepower
F is 270 = 2nmax.
4.2 Experimental Setup
We deployed an experimental setup that looks like Figure
3, on the AWS cloud in Ohio. Some testing is prevented
since it requires attacking live operational name-servers.
The setup includes a client, a recursive resolver, two
authoritative servers: one for the attacker, and one for the
victim. For each component, we use a large EC2 machine
with 16Gb RAM and 4 vCPUs. The authoritative server
runs BIND 9.12.3 in authoritative operation mode, while
the recursive resolver runs BIND 9.12.3 in recursion
mode. The client is deployed on a different machine,
configured to send DNS requests directly to our recursive
resolver.
We chose BIND because it is known as the most widely-
used DNS server implementation [11,20], and is consid-
ered as the de-facto standard for DNS servers. Moreover,
a recent work [14] shows that the majority of open DNS
resolvers operate BIND. We tested multiple versions of
BIND in our experiments (different minor versions of 9.11
and 9.12), with no notable differences. Here we present
the results as experimented with BIND 9.12.3.
To show that the vulnerability is not unique to BIND,
we also provide in §4.4 our results on open recursive
resolvers including Google, CloudFlare, Dyn and others.
All the open resolvers that we tested were observed with a
considerable amplification when sending a single request
of the NXNSAttack.
4.3 Cost and Amplification Analysis
In Subsection 4.1 we computed F , the amplifier firepower,
which is the total number of DNS requests generated by
the amplifier, which was 2(min(n,(Max_rq−1)/2)) if
the attack is on an SLD domain, and 2n if the attack
is on a TLD or root servers (results in F = 74 and 270
respectively). The 2 factor here is due to requesting IPv4
address and IPv6 separately. But how many packets and
bytes does it translate into? We both measure it in our
setup and explain (calculate) the observed numbers by
analyzing the protocol used by BIND.
We claim that the cost to the victim in packets, de-
noted Cpktv , as a result of one client request, as a function
of F , is:
Cpktv = 2 ·F · (1+5 ·TC) (1)
Where TC, the value of the truncate bit in the DNS
protocol, equals 1 if the F requests fall back to TCP,
and 0 otherwise. The TC bit indicates whether the UDP
DNS request/response has failed due to UDP packet size
limitation and is retried in TCP. This often happens
when the delegated name-servers support DNSSEC sign-
ing (e.g., TLD servers, as we observed in our evaluation
in §4.3). In such cases, the resolver retry (request and
response) involve additional TCP control packets. In
our evaluation in §4.3 we observe that each such TCP
request response involves a total of 10 packets: DNS
request, DNS response, and 8 TCP control packets (3
for handshake, and 5 for session termination).
The factor of 2 in (1) is because we count both the
packets sent and received by the recursive resolver or
the authoritative victim towards their attack-cost. Tradi-
tionally, in DDoS bandwidth attacks the packets/bytes
amplification factor is the number of packets/bytes that
are sent to the victim divided by the number of pack-
ets/bytes the attacker sends. However, the NXNSAttack
is both a bandwidth and a complexity attack, consuming
different resources at the victim. The victim name-server
is forced to receive many packets, process them, make
memory accesses, consume cache/memory capacity, and
respond with new DNS request or response packets in-
cluding TCP connections. Therefore, towards the analy-
sis of the amplification factor we consider the packets the
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victim (the recursive or the authoritative) both receives
and sends.
Equation (1) provides Cpktv , the cost incurred by the
victim (recursive resolver or authoritative server) when
attacked by the amplifier. In calculating the packet am-
plification factor (PAF) of the different attacks, we need
to divide the victim cost by the cost incurred by the
attacker, denoted Cpkta . In both attack a and b (follow-
ing Fig. 3) the attacker sends two messages, the client
request, and the referral response from the attacker con-
trolled authoritative name-server. In attack c, Fig. 6, the
attacker’s authoritative server sends 74 packets making
Cpkta = 75.
PAF is the ratio between the number of packets pro-
cessed by the victim and the number of packets sent by
the attacker, i.e., PAF = C
pkt
v
C
pkt
a
. Similarly, the bandwidth
amplification factor, BAF = C
bw
v
Cbwa
. Where, Cbwa and Cbwv
are the number of bytes that the attacker and victim
have to send/process respectively.
The costs discussed above are incurred with every
client request because the attacker’s authoritative server
issues referral requests with new and different fake (non-
existent) names each time. In addition, there are one
time costs that we ignore but will show up in our measure-
ments. These represent the packets exchanged between
the recursive resolver and the ROOT/TLD authorita-
tive name-servers to resolve the attacker and the victim
name-servers respectively. Since these name-servers are
cached after the first client request, we do not consider
them in the packets cost analysis.
In Table 2 and below we analyze each attack variant,
describing the variant and comparing its measured cost
to its calculated cost according to the model above.
(a) Recursive resolver attack (row a in Table 2).
Here each attacker’s referral (step 3 in Figure 3) contains
delegations to many new and different name-servers of
the .com zone. The zone file contains millions of NS
records, and looks like this:
ORIGIN sd0.attacker.com.
sd0.attacker.com. IN NS ns1.fakens0.com.
sd0.attacker.com. IN NS ns1.fakens1.com.
...
sd0.attacker.com. IN NS ns1.fakens-n.com.
Considering that .com and other TLD name-servers
are external to our setup, we initiated only a few requests
for sd*.attacker.com, while monitoring the recursive
resolver behavior.
First, we experimentally measured that nmax = 135
in our setup. The resulting firepower is thus 270 requests
that are sent to one of the .com TLD name-servers, asking
‘who is ns1.fakens*.com?’. The .com name-server re-
sponds with negative responses (NXDOMAIN). However,
all TLD responses also contain a SOA record, RRSIG
and multiple NSEC3 signatures (DNSSEC signatures),
thus exceeding the maximum response size, of 512 bytes,
therefore, setting the TC bit on, and forcing the resolver
to repeat the 270 queries over TCP (which in addition
creates a lot of overhead on the resovler and the authori-
tatives to handle these TCP connections). Thus, Cpktv by
equation (1) is 3240. In the setup we measured 3243 due
to the initial one time non-recurring resolution of the
attacker’s authoritative server, and the victim recursive
resolver addresses. The PAF is thus C
pkt
v
2 = 1620.
We also measured the BAF in our setup which turned
out to be 163, which is very close to what expected when
taking into account the sizes of the different packets.
Note that here the .com TLD can also be considered
as a victim because it processes the same packets as the
recursive resolver under attack. Moreover, as described
in Figure 5a, several resolvers may be used to mount
a massive attack on any TLD or root server. We also
performed this experiment with other TLDs (.live and
.online) and received the exact same results.
(b) Authoritative SLD attack: To attack a par-
ticular SLD server, each attacker’s referral is crafted
to contain delegations to many new and different sub-
domains of the victim SLD (e.g., fakens1.victim.com,
fakens2.victim.com, ...).
In this attack variant, BIND max-recursion-queries
threshold does limit the number of iterative requests
to 75. To test this attack we used two name-servers,
one as the attacker’s and one as the victim. Since our
authoritative victim does not use DNSSEC, no TCP
retries are involved. Thus, Cpktv = 2 ·74 = 148 and PAF
is C
pkt
v
2 = 74x. The victim bytes cost is Cbwv = 22,073
bytes, and the attacker bytes cost is 1,049 bytes which
leads to BAF of 21x. As before the measurement on
one client request is 150 rather than 148 due to the
one time resolution of the attacker and resolver servers,
which should not be counted towards the PAF or BAF
calculations.
(c) ROOT TLD attack. To attack a TLD or root
servers (a tough challenge since there are hundreds of
them, using any-cast and load balancing) one can try
variant a, or with much fewer client requests as described
here (using variant c). In this experiment, the attacker
uses the self-delegations technique (Fig. 6 as described
in §3.2) to achieve a double amplification effect and
launch a long-lived attack against the ROOT or TLD
name-servers. The attacker’s first referral (step 3 in the
figure) contains n1 different sub-domains of itself (e.g.,
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Victims Cost Factors Packets Cost PAF Bytes Cost BAF
Firepower TC bit Attacker Victim Attacker Victim
(F ) retry TCP Cpkta C
pkt
v C
bw
a C
bw
v
a recursive resolver, 270 1 2 M 3,243 1621x 3,967 647,107 163x
a TLD name-server C 3,240
b SLD name-sever, 74 0 2 M 150 74x 1,049 22,073 21x
b e.g., victim.com C 148
c ROOT or TLD ns 74x270 1 76 M81,428 1071x 142,487 14,126,945 99x
C239,760
Table 2: Different attack variants cost as a result of one client request, using BIND (M - is measured, C - is calculated).
sd1.attacker.com, ... , sdF1.attacker.com), forcing
the resolver to send 2n1 additional queries (step 4) to
resolve the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of these delegated
name-servers. The attacker server then responds to these
(step 5) with 2n1 = F1 referral delegations each with
n2 delegations. This results in total of 2 ·F1 ·n2 dele-
gations, each of which is a name of a fake TLD server
(e.g., ns.fake1, ns.fake2, .... , ns.fakef1xf1x2). F1 is
constrained by the max-recursion-queries parameter to
74 and n2 to 135 by the nmax. Resulting in a maximum
amplifier fan-out in this variant of 74 ·270.
In this experiment there is a huge discrepancy be-
tween the measured and calculated victim cost (81,428
vs. 239,760). This is since many packets and requests
are lost in the experiment, because the resolver has to
send and receive 19,980 requests at the same time, which
it fails to do.
Long-lived attacks simulation. So far we mostly
discussed the attack power as a result of one client re-
quest. Since the attack is using non-existent domain
names, the cache mechanisms do not help, and the at-
tack is long-lived. To show this we simulate a long-lived
attack using variant b that does not interact with ex-
ternal authoritative servers; hence we could experiment
it on our setup without leaking any attack packets out-
side of the virtual lab. As appears in Table 2, F of this
variant is 74, thus we include 37 name-servers names
in each NS referral response. We monitor the packets
processed in both the recursive resolver, and the victim
authoritative server in the test-bed. We used the resperf
tool [25] on the client machine (acts as the attacker) to
send a query stream consisting of many unique DNS
‘A’ requests to sd*.attacker.com. As seen in Figure 7
(See the ‘Original BIND’ line), 10,000 attacker requests
result in 1,500,319 packets involved in the recursive res-
olutions, producing a constant PAF of 75x. Here each
client query ends with a SERVFAIL, but the recursive re-
solver’s cache is filled with 740,000 NXDOMAIN records
(each client request triggers 37 IPv4 resolutions, and 37
IPv6 resolutions), and 10,000 NS records. Thus both
having a large PAF, and saturating the cache and the
memory very fast.
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000
0
60,061
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,500,319
Requests
N
um
be
r
of
IP
v4
pa
ck
et
s
in
vo
lv
ed
Original BIND
BIND with Max1Fetch §5
Figure 7: NXNSAttack long-lived simulation against an
SLD authoritative server. A Constant PAF of 75x in the
original BIND compared with PAF 3x of Max1Fetch (see
§5). Recall that attacker cost is 2 ·#requests.
4.4 Public DNS servers
Here we tested whether public DNS servers (such as,
cloudflare, Google, Quad9, etc.) could be used as the
resolver in the amplifier and what firepower one can get
when using them. The DNS software among the public
resolvers varies, some have their own proprietary imple-
mentation. Our test setup is as in Figure 3, where the
recursive resolver is the public DNS server we test. We
used attack variation b, in which an SLD authoritative
is the victim, and we used our own ns.victim.com as
the victim. Since we cannot really mount an attack us-
ing a public DNS server, we tested each with one client
request at a time, for several requests until finding the
maximum firepower. The results are given in Table 3. We
could not test variants a, and c, because these require
monitoring the recursive resolver or the TLD/ROOT
servers. To this end, we deployed ‘malicious’ name-server
that responds to queries for xxx.attacker.live and
sent few queries to each one of the public resolvers, re-
questing sdX.attacker.live. For each such request, our
name-server, ns.attacker.live, responded with a referral
response with a different number and sub-domains of
the victim (our name-server, victim.online). For each
request sent, we monitored how many requests arrive
at the victim name-server. All the public DNS resolvers
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that we tested exhibited a large PAF, on a single request
of the NXNSAttack. Some have a higher PAF than the
one observed in BIND for this variant b (74x).
Public DNS recursive resolver
(IP)
Max #
of dele-
gations
= F/2
Victim
cost
Cpktv
PAF
CloudFlare (1.1.1.1) 24 96 48x
Comodo Secure (8.26.56.26) 140 870 435x
DNS.Watch (84.200.69.80) 135 972 486x
Dyn (216.146.35.35) 50 408 204x
FreeDNS (37.235.1.174) 50 100 50x
Google (8.8.8.8) 15 60 30x
Hurricane (74.82.42.42) 50 98 49x
Level3 (209.244.0.3) 135 546 273x
Norton ConnectSafe
(199.85.126.10)
140 1138 569x
OpenDNS (208.67.222.222) 50 64 32x
Quad9 (9.9.9.9) 100 830 415x
SafeDNS (195.46.39.39) 135 548 274x
Ultra (156.154.71.1) 100 810 405x
Verisign (64.6.64.6) 50 404 202x
Table 3: Firepower and PAF of public resolvers as a
response to a single request in the NXNSAttack.
4.5 NXNSAttack vs. NXDomain Attack
and its effects on the DNS system
Both NXDomain and NXNSAttack use non-existing do-
main names to bypass the recursive caches and reach
different name servers. The NXDomain attack (water
torture [16,28]) is easier to launch, because it does not
require a malicious authoritative server. However, the
NXNSAttack is more destructive in two parameters;
First, its PAF is ranging from 74x to 1602x, while the
PAF of the NXDomain attack is 3x. Secondly, while
the NXNSAttack continuously consumes memory and
ns-cache records in the resolver, whether or not negative
caching is enabled, the NXDomain attack does not have
this effect on the memory or the cache of the resolver,
it only grows the negative cache (NX records) and at
a slower pace. Notice that some ISPs have decided to
disable negative caching due to considerations such as
the increased pervasiveness of one-time signals and dis-
posable domains [10], thus completely eliminating the
cache growth during an NXDomain attack. Therefore,
since it has been reported [24, 26] that ISP recursive
resolvers were knocked down by the NXDomain attacks,
we conclude that the NXNSAttack would also take down
these servers, perhaps even faster.
Attack effectiveness Comparison. While variant
b of the NXNSAttack is the least effective, with the small-
est PAF and likely also the smallest cache consumption
rate, it is the only variant we can easily compare against
the NXDomain attack in a stress test in our setup. We
used the same setup as in the long-lived test in Section
4.3.
In the comparison we measured, MaxQps, the maxi-
mum rate of attacker client requests before the victim
resolver or the authoritative server starts to lose requests.
We prepared a file that contains one million requests
for each attack (each has different bogus requests to in-
stigate the attack) and gave it to resperf stress tool by
Nominum [25], running on the client (We did not use
queryperf [7] of BIND because it has been reported [25]
to produce poor results.) The MaxQps throughput is de-
termined as the point at which the server starts dropping
queries, and the response rate stops growing, meaning
that the server capacity has been exceeded.
The results show that the MaxQps of the BIND recur-
sive resolver significantly degrades under the NXNSAt-
tack with a peak of 932 Qps. The resolver throughput
under the NXDomain attack is 3708 Qps. This mainly
attests to the much higher PAF of the NXNSAttack,
which requires much fewer malicious client’s requests to
saturate the resolver. As a reference, the max throughput
that we measured under non-attack traffic (e.g., our cam-
pus DNS trace and top million domains) varies between
6,000 (in case that most of the requests are not cached)
to more than 100,000 Qps (where most of the requests
are already in the cache).
4.6 Saturating the DNS server
We do not have access to a real authoritative, or resolver
servers in order to show how they fail under attack. As an
alternative, we measure here the maximum rate of NXN-
SAttack type requests that each such server installed on
a strong EC2 machine can handle before losing requests.
Since this rate of requests is easily attained by the NXN-
SAttack we deduce that the attack can easily reach the
level required to take down these servers. We used an
xlarge EC2 machine (4 vCPU with 16GB memory) with
BIND 9.12.3 in both resolver mode and authoritative
mode. In resolver mode it starts to lose requests at a
rate of 932 client requests per second (same requests that
are issued by attacking clients in NXNSAttack). In this
experiment, we observed a large CPU resource difference
between the victim and the attacker; the victim 4 vCPU
resolver load exceeded 390%, while at the same time, the
attacker’s authoritative 1 vCPU load was only 3%. In
authoritative mode we fed the authoritative two different
streams of requests. The first, a stream of ‘A’ requests,
and it starts to lose requests when reaching a rate of
68,208 Rps. In the second, a stream of NXDOMAIN
random requests same as the requests that are sent to
an authoritative victim in an NXNSAttack (e.g., in step
4 in Figure 3), and the maximum rate achieved was
65,418 Rps. Therefore, to overwhelm the authoritative
an NXNSAttack of 1,000 client requests per second (with
PAF=x75) would be sufficient.
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5 Attack Mitigation: Max1Fetch
5.1 Possible and Existing Measures
The first mitigation techniques that come to mind are
methods to identify and detect authoritative name-
servers that issue many malicious NS referral responses.
These are servers whose referral responses result with
many SERVFAIL resolutions of the delegated servers.
However, this requires sophisticated identification algo-
rithms to distinguish miss-behaving authoritative servers,
and the attackers will insert legitimate delegations in
between to miss-lead the detection. Moreover, such ma-
licious name-servers can dynamically change their name
and IP address (in the same manner as malicious C&C
servers do).
Following the NXDomain attack, recent versions of
BIND have new manual rate limiting features designed
to throttle queries from a resolver to authoritatives that
are under attack. These rate-limiters, (e.g., ‘fetch-limits’,
fetches-per-server, and fetches-per-zone.) are however a
double-edged sword, and can become a way to DDoS an
authoritative by issuing many requests to hit the thresh-
old and block legitimate requests. Moreover, setting a
rate-limit per authoritative zone or per authoritative
name-server does not protect the recursive resolver from
the NXNSAttack.
5.2 Max1Fetch
We propose to amortize the resolution of multiple dele-
gations for a zone over multiple requests that use that
zone, one or few resolutions per request, rather than re-
solving all the delegations of the zone at once, when the
referral for the zone first arrives. Thus, in general, each
request while using an already delegated name-server,
resolves the IP address of an additional delegated name-
server to be ready for the next request. Until all the
delegations that were provided in a referral response are
resolved. Here we only provide a high level description
of Max1Fetch. A detailed discussion is relegated to a
followup paper.
We have modified BIND 9.12.3 resolver algorithm to
implement Max1Fetch. The max number of external
fetches (additional resolutions) we enforce at each level
is configurable. MaxkFetch allows the resolution of k
additional delegations that do not have an associated IP
address, per request. In Max1Fetch a resolver that uses
a zone z while resolving a request, checks if there are
unresolved delegations for z, in z’s NS record. If such a
delegation is found, the resolver initiates the resolution of
this delegation, while continuing in parallel the resolution
of the original request, using an already resolved delegate
for zone z. Notice that the first request that uses zone
z (which has also received the corresponding referral
response) may have to wait for the resolution of the first
delegate if all of them came without a glue record in
the referral response (or all are out-of-bailiwick.) In this
case the second request that uses zone z will use the
same delegate that the first one used (one may consider
resolving two delegations in the first request, something
we have not implemented).
It is important to note that Max1Fetch does not have
negative effect on the latency of a request resolution
(see latency analysis in §5.3 and §5.4), nor does it dis-
turb the RTT estimation algorithms (such as sRTT).
Most recursive resolvers perform latency-wise algorithms
to decide about the next-server to approach. However,
Max1Fetch does not disrupt these algorithms because
it allows a resolution of an additional name-server that
may be selected in the next client request, and after
enough requests all the delegations are resolved. The
resolution of an additional name-server is not adding
to the latency of a response since each request, except
the first, uses a previously resolved name-server while
issuing the additional resolution in parallel.
In the next sub-sections we evaluate and compare the
original BIND and Max1Fetch. We focus on the impact
on the latency and the number of packets, per client
request, under normal traffic and under attack.
5.3 Max1Fetch evaluation under NXN-
SAttack
In Figure 7 (§4.1) we compare the PAF of the original
BIND to that of the Max1Fetch variant, during a long-
lived simulated NXNSAttack against an SLD victim.
The blue line shows that Max1Fetch enhancement avoids
most of the additional resolutions, since it initiates only
two additional requests, one IPv4, and one IPv6 per
reqest. Instead of 1,500,319 packets exchanged by the
original BIND recursive resolver (as a result of 10,000
malicious client requests), Max1Fetch exchanges only
60,061 packets (The measuredMac1Fetch PAF is reduced
from 75x to 3x).
Orig Bind 9.12.3 Max1Fetch
Max requests/sec 932 3390
Avg. Latency (ms) 4.31 1.32
Median Latency (ms) 4 1
std Latency 4.51 1.37
Table 4: Comparing BIND resolver performance under
NXNSAttack with and without Max1Fetch.
We have also repeated the stress testing as in §4.5 to
measure the maximal number of client queries per second
that BIND resolver is able sustain under NXNSAttack
with and without Max1Fetch. As seen in Table 4, BIND
with Max1Fetch is capable of processing many more
attack requests, 3,390 vs. 932 under the NXNSAttack
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Figure 8: Data-set B (Campus trace) requests per hour
profile.
(and 3708 orig. BIND under the NXDomain attack §4.5).
We also compared the latency of attack requests with
and without Max1Fetch. The latency values are observed
at the attacker client that generates requests during a
simulation of the NXNSAttack against an SLD victim
in our test bed. Table 4 shows the average, median, and
std latency, under attack, with and without Max1Fetch.
5.4 Max1Fetch in normal operation
Here we evaluate the recursive resolver operation under
real-life scenarios. We compare the original BIND and
Max1fetch to measure: (i) the latency of client queries.
(ii) number of IPv4 packets processed by the resolver in
the resolution of real-life queries. The purpose is twofold:
first, we verify that the Max1Fetch modification does not
incur query delays or resolution failures (i.e., the number
of SERVFAIL and NOERROR responses is not higher
than the one observed in the original BIND). Second,
we measure the impact of the Out-of-Bailiwick overhead
on the recursive resolver under normal operation, to
determine whether the cache mitigates this overhead
over time.
5.4.1 Data-sets
Two data-sets are used to study the normal operation of
the BIND resolver:
Dataset A: A list of the top million domains [17].
Here we executed DNS ‘A’ requests (IPv4 resolution) for
the first 100,000 domains in this list.
Dataset B: Campus DNS trace. A 24 hours trace
of live DNS traffic observed at our campus DNS server.
We exclude all internal queries for domains that reside
within the campus zone. This leaves us with 1,027,359
incoming requests, out of which we take only the ‘A’
requests, which result in 386,736 queries. Notice that
only 10,092 are unique requests. Figures 8a ,8b show how
the total 386,736 queries and the 10,092 unique queries,
respectively, are spread over the day.
Ethical Consideration: Dataset B is a sequence of
DNS queries with their timestamps but without the IP
addresses that originated them.
Dataset A Dataset B
(100K top domains) (Campus trace)
Resolver Original Max1- Original Max1-
Impl. BIND Fetch BIND Fetch
Total Req. 100,000 100,000 386,691 386,691
Unique Req. 100,000 100,000 10,092 10,092
Total recur-
sion packets
747,494 650,864 454,032 422,946
NOERROR 363028 363031
SERVFAIL 18911 18910
NXDOMAIN 4752 4750
Latency (ms)
Mean 157.37 155.95 41.50 40.97
Median 53 52 13 13
Std 298.63 293.37 101.03 95.81
Table 5: Comparing between original BIND and
Max1Fetch during the resolution of query streams of
Datasets A and B
With each data-set, we send its query stream (100,000
queries in Dataset A, and 386,736 queries in Data-set
B) to both original BIND and BIND with Max1Fetch.
The resolvers cache is empty at the beginning of each
experiment. The cache size is 1GB, which is sufficient
to store all the responses of the input query stream. We
record the traffic between the recursive resolver and the
authoritative hierarchy, as well as collecting the BIND
statistics.
5.4.2 Results
Number of extra resolutions. First we measure
whether Max1Fetch reduces the overhead that was ob-
served in the resolution process in practice (see §2.2).
Figure 9 and the fourth row (Total recursion packets)
in Table 5 show the number of packets processed by the
recursive resolver (with and without Max1Fetch) in each
of the data-sets. The resolver using original BIND ex-
changes 14.84% more packets in the resolution of queries
from Data-set A than the Max1Fetch variant (747,494 vs.
650,864). Similarly, in Dataset B (Campus DNS trace),
original BIND exchanged 7.34% more packets (454,032
vs. 422,946).
The green lines in Figures 9a, and 9b show the reso-
lution overhead in percentages (( PacketsorigPacketsmax1fetch −1) ·
100). As seen, in both datasets, the gaps after the first
1000 requests show a high overhead of more than 50%.
The gap in percentages is decreasing as long as we send
more requests since the cache is filled with answers
to previous requests that share the same name-servers.
However, after 20K requests, the gap remains stable (at
around 15% in DatasetA, and 7% in Dataset B) until the
end of the experiment. Indeed, we see that Max1Fetch
does not introduce more SERVFAIL than original BIND
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Figure 9: The number of recursion packets exchanged by a BIND resolver (with and without Max1Fetch) in the
resolution of Data-set A and B query streams. The green line shows the overhead that is relative to Max1Fetch.
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Latency (ms)
C
D
F
Original BIND
Max1Fetch
(a) 100K top domains
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Latency (ms)
C
D
F
Original BIND
Max1Fetch
(b) Campus trace
Figure 10: Latency of queries in Datasets A and B: Com-
parison between original BIND and Max1Fetch
in the resolution the 386,691 queries in Dataset B (see
the fifth row in Table 5).
Latency. The last row in Table 5 shows the aver-
age, median and std latency, in both datasets, with and
without Max1Fetch. The results exhibit a slightly faster
response time using Max1Fetch: 157.37ms using original
BIND vs. 155.95ms using Max1Fetch in Dataset A (top
domains), and 41.5ms vs. 40.97ms in Dataset B (campus
trace). Notice that in Dataset B, the majority of the
queries are served by the resolver cache because not all
the requests are unique (see Figure 8b). Thus, when
calculating the average, median and std calculations,
we exclude queries with zero latency (we consider only
114,570 out of 386,691 queries).
Figures 10a, 10b show the cumulative distribution of
the queries latency values with and without Max1Fetch
in Datasets A and B respectively. The latency values
are between 0 and 5 seconds. In both datasets, the orig-
inal BIND and Max1Fetch CDF lines are overlapping,
exhibiting a similar distribution.
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Figure 11: 100K Dataset: 99th percentile latency com-
parison
The 99th percentile latency distribution in Dataset A
(top domains) is provided in Figure 11. The quantile val-
ues (cut points of the 99th percentile) for original BIND
and Max1Fetch are 1,414ms and 1,382ms respectively.
Similar 99th percentile distribution in Dataset B appears
in Figure 12.
Figure 13 presents the latency differences per domain
request (between original BIND and Max1Fetch) in the
top domains dataset. Here, for each domain d request
we calculate Ldorig−Ldm1f , where Ldorig is the latency of
the query for the domain d using original BIND, and
Ldm1f when using Max1Fetch. Figure 13 shows the dis-
tribution of the calculated values (vary from -5000 to
5000), where positive values represent domain requests
for which Max1Fetch performed faster.
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5.5 Additional remedies
Here we point out additional directions to mitigate the
NXNSAttack. We intend to investigate these approaches
in a followup work.
MaxBreadth: The Max1Fetch proposal mitigates and
significantly reduces the PAF (and BAF) of the attack,
however, the attack still consumes large amounts of mem-
ory and cache (NX, NS records) per client request, in
particular variant c. To mitigate this additional attack
vector we suggest to adopt recommendations to restrict
the breadth, i.e., the number of delegation name-servers
in an NS record of a domain/zone. This restriction is
supported by the observations made in §6 in particular
Table 15 shows that about hundredth of a percent of the
top 1M domains have more than 13 name-servers and
less than one percent have more than 7 name-servers.
The limitation should be a function of the level of the
zone and of the authoritative, from which the referral
that creates the NS record, arrives. Thus for an SLD
zone a default restriction of 4 makes sense. Investigating
the exact limits and effects of this MaxBreadth proposal
is beyond the scope of the current paper, and we plan
to continue evaluating and investigating this restriction
in a followup work.
Behavioral analysis: In the spirit of IPS’s it is possi-
ble to monitor the referral messages incoming to resolvers
and detect abnormally large referrals for zones that ap-
pear only once or a small number of times. Heavy hitters
and distinct heavy hitters Algorithms, such as in [8] may
be used for this. The disadvantage of this approach is that
operators will have to deal with yet one more package
and the upgrade path is not clear. Can such algorithms
be integrated into BIND or other DNS software?
6 The Pervasiveness of Out-of-Bailiwick
Nameservers
Here we measure the prevalence of domains with out-of-
bailiwick name servers. We show that the majority of the
domains out of the top 1M popular sites [17] have out-
of-bailiwick name-servers. Two controlled experiments
to monitor the resolvers operation and to examine the
NS referral responses in the resolutions of the top 1M
domains, are performed.
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Figure 14: Number of domains that their resolution
incurs initiation of extra resolutions by BIND (over top
million domains).
In the first controlled experiment we measured how
many recursive resolutions a BIND based resolver per-
formed when resolving each of the top 1M domains. The
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cache has been cleared before issuing each client request.
We measure the extra resolutions as in the difference
between Figure 1 and 2. That is, at each level of the
hierarchy one resolution is not counted for. Figure 14
shows the cumulative distribution of domains that trigger
additional resolutions (fetches). The figure shows that
60.22% of the domain requests initiate more than one
additional fetches. We see that 374,498 domain requests
do not initiate any additional resolution (38.34%, notice
we count only requests with NOERROR responses).
In the second experiment, we record the communica-
tion between the recursive resolver and the authoritative
structure during the resolution of the 1M domains. In
this case, we do not focus on the BIND operation, but
rather inspect the NS referral responses that are received
from the authoritative hierarchy to measure: (i) how
many name-servers are returned for each domain, (ii)
how many name-servers are not provided with their cor-
responding IP addresses (missing glue-records), and (iii)
which name-servers are out-of-bailiwick. When count-
ing the ammount of out-of-bailiwick name-servers, we
consider both definitions as we discuss in §2.2 (RFC
8499). The first strict definition, describes a name-server
whose name is subordinate to the owner name of the
NS resource record (e.g., ns.child.example.com as name-
server for the domain ‘example.com’). The second wider
definition, refers to a name-server’s name that is sub-
ordinate to the zone origin and not subordinate to the
owner of the NS resource record (e.g., ns.another.com as
name-server for the domain ‘example.com’).
We start by counting in Figure 15 the number of name
servers for each domain. While most of the domains have
two name servers, 33% of the domains have three or
more. Results show that top million domains have an
average of 2.52 name servers per domain.
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million domains
We show the results in Table 6. Only 869,140 out
of 2,394,475 (36.3%) name-servers that appear in the
NS referral responses of the 1M domains are both in-
bailiwick and include a corresponding IP address (glue-
recrod). 1,525,335 (63.7%) name-servers are missing a
Measurement Number
Requests 1,000,000
Answers 1,000,000
NXDOMAIN 20,025
SERVFAIL 20,110
NOERROR 959,865
CNAME Response 1,717
Empty Response 11,498
Domains with nameservers (valid) 946,650
Domains that all their NSs with glue (IP) 342,429
Domains that all their NSs w/o glue. 567,450
Total name-servers in answers 2,394,475
In-bailiwick name-servers (strict def.) 70,596
Out-of-bailiwick name-servers (strict def.) 2,323,879
In-bailiwick name-servers (wider def.) 1,081,876
Out-of-bailiwick name-servers (wider def.) 1,312,599
Name-servers with glue records 869,140
Name-servers w/o glue records 1,525,335
Table 6: Pervasiveness of authoritative nameservers with
missing glue records over top million domains
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Figure 16: CDF of out-of-bailiwick nameservers per
domain
corresponding glue record, from which 1,312,599 are out-
of-bailiwick, showing that some in-bailiwick name-servers
are not provided with their glue-records by their parent
authoritative name-servers. Here we refer to the wider
definition of bailiwick; the results show that most author-
itative name-servers provide glue-records according to
this definition. An additional note is that according to
strict definition of in-bailiwick, we find that only 70,596
name-servers out of 2,394,475 (2.95%) are in-bailiwick,
i.e., their name-servers names are within the domain
name (for example, ‘ns.example.com’ as a name-server
for the domain ‘example.com’).
The blue line in Figure 16 shows the distribution of
the number of name-servers without a glue-record per
domain. The majority of the domains (567,450 out of
946,650 domains with NOERROR responses, 59.94%)
have all their name-servers received without a corre-
sponding glue record (in the NS referral response from
the TLD, or sometimes from an SLD). One reason for
this high number of domains with out-of-bailiwick name-
servers is that many domains outsource their DNS author-
itative service to the same vendors. Out of the 1 million
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we tested, 218,747 (21%) domains use ns.cloudflare.
com and 129,789 use domaincontrol.com.
7 Related Work
Luo et al. [16] analyze the prevalence and characteristics
of the NXDomain and water torture attacks. Using one
month of real-world DNS traffic, they compare the attack
behavior with DGA malware and disposable services.
Recently the DNS infrastructure is facing abuse by
various entities which use it for applications for which
it was not intended. In this case, a large volume of
temporary domain names (aka disposable domains [10])
would be commonly used to benefit these services to
communicate via DNS queries. A study [10] from large
scale DNS traffic shows that 60% of all distinct resource
records observed daily are disposable. Hao et al. [5]
examine the negative impact of disposable domains on
recursive caching. They propose a classification based
on domain name features to increase the cache hit-rate.
Maury [18] presents a different attack that also ex-
ploits the delegations of name-servers in a referral re-
sponse. However, the attack (called iDNS attack) PAF
is at most 10x. In iDNS the attacker’s name-server sends
self-delegations (back and forth to the attacker’s name-
server) up to an infinite depth. A major difference from
our work is that the glueless name-servers in the iDNS
attack are never used against an external server such as
a victim name-server. Some measures have been taken
by different DNS vendors such as BIND and UNBOUND
following the disclosure of iDNS described in [18], how-
ever these measures do not affect and do not weaken the
NXNSAttack.
Wang [31] focuses on the DNS security implications
of glue records. He describes how recursive resolver im-
plementations such as BIND and Unbound treat glue
records, but the focus is on cache poisoning vulnerabili-
ties rather than the impact on the recursive performance,
which is the focus of the current paper.
Muller et al. [23] perform a comprehensive measure-
ment using the RIPE atlas to analyze how recursive
resolvers select which name server to interact with, out
of a set of multiple authoritative servers. The focus is
on how and when the recursive resolvers query a set of
multiple authoritative servers, while in this paper we ex-
tend the discussion and focus on how and when recursive
servers resolve the IP addresses of a set of authoritative
name-servers. In another work [22], Moura et al. analyze
the root DNS service during a specific DDoS attack. How-
ever, the analysis refers to authoritative servers rather
than recursive behavior. In a recent work [21], Moura
et al. measure and show the impact of the caching and
long TTL on dissecting DNS defenses during a DDoS
attack.
8 Disclosure
A responsible disclosure procedure has been performed
following the discovery of the NXNSAttack described in
this paper. The following vendors and providers have
been approached and have patched their software and
servers, most of them according to our MaxFetch(c)
approach: ISC BIND (CVE-2020-8616), NLnet labs
Unbound (CVE-2020-12662), PowerDNS (CVE-2020-
10995), CZ.NIC Knot Resolver (CVE-2020-12667), Cloud-
flare,Google, Amazon,Microsoft, Oracle (DYN),Verisign,
IBM Quad9 and ICANN.
9 Conclusions
You never know what you might find when you go off
looking for your lost donkey. Our initial goal was to
investigate the efficiency of recursive resolvers and their
behavior under different attacks, and we ended up finding
a new seriously looking vulnerability, the NXNSAttack.
The key ingredients of the new attack are (i) the ease
with which one can own or control an authoritative name-
server, and (ii) the usage of non-existent domain names
for name-servers and (iii) the extra redundancy placed
in the DNS structure to achieve fault tolerance and fast
response time.
We note that some of the possible remedies, such as
various rate limiters are a double edge sword remedy,
that a sophisticated attacker may use to deny service to
legitimate clients, by hitting the limiters thresholds with
malicious requests.
Notice that DoH (DNS over Http) is irrelevant to this
paper because it deals with the communication channel
between a client and its recursive resolver while the
issues discussed in this paper are on the communications
between the recursive resolver and the authoritative
structure.
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